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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
so that in the future landowners can frame their sale arrangements in
deliberate reliance on it, and as late as possible in the chain of value-
affecting events, so that the unwary will not find themselves without
redress or with only partial redress for an actual decline in value.
The Washington cases continue to leave open the question whether
a cause of action accrues whenever there is a major change in the
quality of user of the prescriptive easement, as by a change from
propeller driven aircraft to jets or from jets to rockets or such
mammoths as supersonic transports. As has been pointed out,2 ' Martin
opened the door to an affirmative answer in such cases. Since the court
in the principal case did not abrogate any of its earlier pronounce-
ments, the answer seems still to be an affirmative one. Although this
may evoke in terrorem responses, the result is in keeping with the
policy, integral to the result in the principal case, that the public pay
for what it takes.
ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEREST IN INTESTATE
DECEDENTS' ESTATE
Plaintiff, surviving member of a thirteen year meretricious relation-
ship with defendant's decedent, brought an action to establish a half-
interest in the estate, consisting of both real and personal property.
She stated alternative theories of recovery-including resulting trust,
partnership, joint venture, and a pooling agreement-all but the first
being contractually based. Although most of the assets of the estate
were accumulated during their cohabitation, plaintiff was unable to
prove by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence the existence of any
significant monetary investment from her personal funds. The evi-
dence indicated that her contribution to the accumulated assets con-
sisted primarily of labor, including assisting her partner, a masonry
contractor, in building, finishing, and landscaping their home, and in
some of his commercial ventures. The trial court, in denying recovery,
found that no specific agreement existed, and that it was impossible
to trace the funds used to purchase the property. On appeal, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court affirmed, over vigorous dissents, in a 5-4 deci-
sion. Held: When title to property acquired during a meretricious
relationship is held by a decedent, the survivor who seeks to establish
a half-interest in the property, but is unable to demonstrate a con-
tractual arrangement, will be unable to recover the value of services
Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box?,
39 WASH. L. REv. 920, 938 (1965).
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and labor contributed to the property, and such labor and services will
be deemed a gift to the decedent. Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wash.
Dec. 2d 371, 407 P.2d 967 (1965).
Property acquired during cohabitation of a man and woman can be
community property only if they are husband and wife.' Washington
cases establish the rebuttable presumption, relied upon by the court
in the principal case, that parties to a meretricious relationship in-
tended ownership to rest with title.2 Generally, before partnership or
joint venture theories will apply, the parties must have engaged in
some form of commerce or business. Moreover, there cannot be a
resulting trust unless the person claiming ownership furnished the con-
sideration for the property, and there was intent to preclude ownership
in the titleholder.4
While the court discussed the various theories upon which plaintiff
predicated her action, and presented a panorama of various Washing-
ton cases, its reasoning was somewhat obscure. Although it recognized
that Creasman v. Boyle5 was inapposite on its facts, it relied upon the
presumption stated in that case that ownership of property acquired
during a meretricious relationship will follow title. Emphasizing the
fact that plaintiff's "husband" was a businessman, and therefore
knowledgeable of basic property rules,6 the court applied the Creas-
man presumption and concluded that plaintiff should recover nothing.7
'Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
'Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951); Creasman v. Boyle,
31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
' See Eder v. Reddick, 46 Wn. 2d 41, 49, 278 P.2d 361, 365 (1955), where the court
said that a partnership contract must unite the "labor, skill, or property of the parties,
for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce or business for the benefit of all of
them...."
'Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
531 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), 24 WASH. L. REv. 164 (1949). Creasman is
distinguishable from the principal case in that the plaintiff furnished all the consid-
eration for the real property and allowed title to be taken in the name of his para-
mour, who thereafter died. Thus, Creasman is virtually the obverse of the principal
case.
"It appears that the majority opinion unduly emphasized the fact that decedent
was a masonry contractor "experienced in business transactions relating to the pur-
chase and sale of real property ... " 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 387, 407 P.2d at 976. While
he may have been careless in handling familial transactions, it does not follow that the
plaintiff should be penalized.
'In reaching its result, the court relied on the reasoning of Blodgett v. Lowe, 24
Wn. 2d 931, 167 P.2d 997 (1946), that the terms and conditions of an alleged contract
should be established before evidence of services claimed to have been performed
pursuant to the terms of the alleged contract is admissible. While Blodgett is some-
what inapposite, since it involved an oral contract to devise, there appears to be
little reason for the court not to have used it in the principal case, particularly since
plaintiff sought contractual remedies. On the other hand, that approach may have been
the basis for the court's refusal to remand for an evaluation of plaintiff's services and
the potential imposition of an equitable lien.
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Washington cases demonstrate that, unless a party to a meretricious
relationship demonstrates some collateral agreement or business ven-
ture, his chance of establishing a right in property accumulated during
the relationship is rather small.' In the Creasman case, for example,
the plaintiff "husband" sought declaration of a resulting trust in a
house purchased by him, but with his "spouse" named as titleholder.
In denying relief, the court held that he had not produced sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption that parties "considerably more
than 'domestic strangers' to each other" dispose of property according
to the intent of the purchaser, the underlying hypothesis being that
the purchaser made a gift to the titleholder.
On the other hand, when the parties separate after having invested
in business property, the court will grant relief more readily. In the
leading Washington case, Poole v. Schrichte,0 the couple invested, dur-
ing their cohabitation, in a tavern and various other items, most of
which were personal property. While the court awarded plaintiff half
of the personal property, it also awarded her the monetary equivalent
of a half-interest in the tavern. Since the evidence showed that she
financed half its cost, the court found no difficulty in avoiding Creas-
man and characterizing the transaction as a "joint venture or partner-
ship." In so doing, the court ignored the meretricious aspect of the
relationship and proceeded on contract and partnership theories, there-
by establishing that the illegality of a meretricious relationship does
not, as a matter of policy or law, necessarily taint other transactions
between the parties.
When the plaintiff cannot establish a business venture, as in Poole,
the cases seem to indicate that successful establishment of a pooling
agreement or a constructive trust, as a practical matter, turns more
than anything else on whether both parties are alive and able to tes-
tify.'" This situation, no doubt, arises from the evidentiary barrier
of the dead man's statute," and largely accounted for the inability of
Compare Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951) (collateral
agreement), and Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951) (business
venture), with Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
Ibid.
" Compare Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), Engstrom v.
Peterson, 107 Wash. 523, 182 Pac. 623 (1919), and Stans v. Baitey, 9 Wash. 115, 37
Pac. 316 (1894), with West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 311 P2d 689 (1957), Walberg
v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951), Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558,
236 P.2d 1044 (1951), and Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wn. 2d 660, 184 P.2d 68 (1947). In the
former group of cases, plaintiff surviving member of a meretricious relationship was
unsuccessful; in the latter group, where both parties were before the court, plaintiffs
recovered.
" WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.030 (1956).
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the plaintiff in the principal case to recover. The court, in fact, seems
to imply that the Creasman presumption was primarily designed to
apply in cases in which the dead man's statute limits admissible
evidence.' -
Judge Hamilton, in his dissenting opinion, observed that, had plain-
tiff's evidence revealed a specific monetary expense, the court would
have had no trouble impressing a pro tanto equitable lien upon the
property.' 3 The dissenters emphasized that the plaintiff should have
recovered the reasonable value of her labor in the accumulated prop-
erty and/or the amount which this labor caused the property to appre-
ciate in value, in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the decedent's
heirs. While this relief would have been preferable to the result
reached by the majority, it would still circumvent the question
whether the survivor of a meretricious relationship will be allowed
a half-interest in property accumulated during their cohabitation.
Plaintiff's desire was to establish the type of interest derived not from
a showing of a particular investment, but from a general understand-
ing between the decedent and herself. To demand proof along strict
contractual lines is unrealistic; most people simply do not realize all
the legal implications of their private transactions, and are unlikely
to keep detailed financial records in noncommercial activities.
While the result in the principal case followed naturally from the
case law, and the Creasman presumption in particular, the very close-
ness of the decision indicates the undesirability of indulging in pre-
sumptions, and the advantage of compelling the court to weigh
equitably the evidence presented with a view toward doing justice to
the parties. The effect of the Creasman presumption is not to aid the
court in deciding hard cases, but to deny justice by preordaining the
result when the plaintiff is unfortunate enough to have had his or
her partner die without a written agreement regarding disposition of
the property.
Judge Finley inveighed against the confining ownership-follows-
title theory of the majority as a "washing of hands device" which is
incapable of meeting and providing "real solutions for the real prob-
lems of real people." 4 Coupling the Creasman presumption with the
"67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 380, 407 P2d at 972.
"Id. at 397, 407 P.2d at 982 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 392, 407 P.2d at 979. Judge Finley characterized the Creasnzan presumption,
as interpreted by the majority, as conclusive, rather than rebuttable, throughout his
dissent. While his statements could be misleading if taken in isolation, his construction
seems accurate when the presumption is applied to a case involving the dead man statute.
19661
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dead man statute, plus requiring clear, cogent, and convincing evi-
dence of a pooling contract, is to demand the unrealistic and effectuate
a rule of law which operates purely by accident or, conceivably, by
the cunning, anticipatory designs of one of the parties to a meretricious
relationship." By choosing this method of disposing of the principal
case, the court has created a rule which may prove both difficult and
embarrassing. It would have been far more desirable, for example,
to adopt the approach of the New York Appellate Division in M11uller
v. Sobol,'6 in which the plaintiff brought an action to impose a trust
based on a joint venture despite the fact that his evidence was in-
sufficient to establish an express agreement to pool property. Not-
withstanding this, the court decreed a half-interest in the accumu-
lated property to the plaintiff "husband" to the meretricious relation-
ship, on the theory that such an agreement was implicit in the relation-
ship-the idea being that it was unrealistic to believe that the parties
would contribute money and labor to such a relationship for twenty-
two years without such an agreement. This approach is not only more
realistic than that of the majority in the principal case, but it is
consonant with the view that parties to a meretricious relationship
are not so reprehensible that their formal or informal arrangements
are thereby rendered unenforceable.1
7
Adoption of an approach similar to that of the New York court is
most desirable because of its conformity to the probable intent of the
parties and its congruity with current mores. Alternatively, the dis-
senters' conclusion that the plaintiff should recover the value of her
labor and monetary contribution by way of imposition of an equitable
lien is a potentially satisfactory result. Their approach is merely
"potentially" satisfactory because it may be, as a practical matter,
that the dead man statute could still prevent all but minimal recovery.
In addition, the need for rigorous documentary proof of monetary
contribution, or the pitfalls implicit in attempting to evaluate labor,
particularly in domestic areas, may lead to unsatisfactory results.
However, while less desirable than the approach of the New York
court, the minority view would not only provide greater redress to the
surviving member of a meretricious relationship than the result reached
'See the concurring opinion of Finley, J., in West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311,
315-21, 311 P.2d 689, 692-95 (1957).
"277 App. Div. 884, 97 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1950).
'7 This attitude is implicit in Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044
(1951), discussed in text accompanying note 9 supra.
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in the principal case, but it also would foster a flexibility which could
prove to be advantageous in the future.
APPLICABILITY OF REAL ESTATE SALES TAX TO
TRANSFERS FOR BENEFIT OF UNFORMED
CORPORATION
A corporate promoter entered into an earnest money agreement
which contemplated corporate purchase of real property. At the
planned closing date, the incorporation process was incomplete. To
avoid losing the property, the promoter entered into a real estate con-
tract naming himself and two nominees as purchaser-trustees to hold
the property in trust for the benefit of the proposed corporation. The
one-percent real estate sales tax1 was paid by the seller, since the trans-
fer to the trustees constituted a sale.2 One month later, the beneficiary
was incorporated. Pursuant to the trust agreement, the trustees trans-
ferred the property to the corporation by quitclaim deeds executed
separately by each trustee for nominal consideration. King County
assessed an identical tax upon this transfer, contending that it was a
second sale. The trustees, who were incorporators, paid the tax under
protest, claiming double assessment, and brought action to recover the
tax. On appeal, judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed. Held: Where
an earnest money agreement for purchase of real property expressly
contemplates that the purchaser will be a corporation, and the incor-
porators accept title in trust since the incorporation process is incom-
plete, the subsequent conveyance of title from the incorporators to
the beneficiary corporation is not a "sale" and hence not a taxable
event for purposes of the transfer tax. Senfour Investment Co. v. King
County, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 61,401 P.2d 319 (1965).
The sales tax statute provides that: "the term 'sale' shall have its
ordinary meaning and shall include any conveyance ... for a valuable
consideration, and any contract for such conveyance. ... "' The im-
port of these provisions is that application of the tax depends upon the
transfer of an interest in land for valuable consideration. In Deer Park
Pine Indus. v. Stevens County,4 the court held that, since stockholders
X'VAsH. REv. CODE § 28.45.050 (1963) provides: The county commissioners of
any county are authorized by ordinance to levy an excise tax upon sales of real
estate not exceeding one per cent of the selling price.
-VAsH. REv. CODE § 28.45.010 (1963).
'WAsH. REv. CoDE§ 28.45.010 (1963).
'46 Wn. 2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
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